Finland Futures Research Centre
Replication of bioenergy projects - what factors determine its success?
by Sverre Tvinnereim, Assistant Professional Officer, FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
There is no shortage of small-scale bioenergy projects in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). Several donor, as well as community and private sector, initiatives have been tried out over the last decade. Many of these have shown great promise regarding rural development. Yet, while creating a successful and long-term activity may be tough enough in itself, replication normally proves much more difficult still. To learn more about how cases of best practice can be disseminated successfully FAO, in partnership with the Thailand Rural and Social Management Institute (RASMI) launched a study into the challenges of replicating community-based rural bio-energy projects in Thailand. The objective of the study was to understand the critical factors of success for development and replication of small-scale bioenergy projects in three regions in Thailand. The study was built around three core projects which had achieved success in terms of energy generation, duration, etc. We then investigated 17 communities that had attempted, with various levels of success, to replicate one of the three example projects.
Main findings
Going through our research material we find that there might be a number of different factors influencing the success rate of replication, and that these may come into play with different strengths in different communities.
However, a strong motivation and unity in a community that tries to replicate a certain bioenergy activity seems to be one of the most important ingredients. Likewise, in successful cases of replication there also seems to be a "champion", with strong technical and managerial skills, who pushes the implementation process and disseminates knowledge. No cases of replication, nor the original project for that matter, turned out to be sustainable on a long-term basis without carefully integrating "support mechanisms" - such as systems for maintenance, training programs and availability of funding.
In a few cases we found a positive link between the use of bioenergy and switching to organic farming (for example by combing the local production of charcoal and using wood vinegar derived from the process). This depicts how consumption of bioenergy can lead to a more holistic use of the input material - including its waste. Finally, an important factor in Thailand is the reference to Sufficiency Economy which builds on five principles mainly focusing on mental strength, modesty and decentralized production systems. As this concept has been promoted by the much-revered King Bhumibol himself it carries strong support in the country.
On the negative side it was discovered that communities that experienced lack of support from local political institutions had a much lower rate of success. Lack of knowledge was also a prominent source to failure.
Based on the findings of the project we recommend that the authorities ensure adequate support mechanisms (maintenance, financing etc.) before implementing these bioenergy activities. Training is also imperative for success.
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This thematic study is part of a larger Technical Co-operation Project run by FAO, which focuses on renewable energy for rural development and poverty alleviation in the GMS countries. We will organize a regional workshop in late 2010 to summarize all the findings and provide policy recommendations for relevant national and regional political bodies.
Why a RE technology doesn't have to be a project to be successful
by Mattijs Smits, PhD candidate, Geography,
University of Sydney
Why Renewable Energy Projects Fail or Succeed?" is the subtitle of the DREAM study of the FFRC. The emphasis in this study is probably more on the failures rather than the success. Rightfully so, I would argue. When looking back at the history of development aid, it is legitimate to ask: why do projects in general fail or succeed? In this column I want to look at an opposite example: a renewable energy technology that never has been a project, but is nevertheless a remarkable success.
Pico-hydropower turbines (from 300 watt to 2 kW) are widely used to generate electricity in off-grid areas of the Lao PDR, on a household level. A census quoted by the ADB tells us that 22% of the villagers have access to electricity through this technology. Elsewhere, the author has estimated the number of units throughout Laos at 60,000. This is at least four times as much as the amount of solar home systems, the technology which has been aggressively promoted through many renewable energy projects in Laos over the last decades, mainly by development organisations such as the World Bank and JICA. Other small-scale renewable energy technologies, like biogas and micro-hydropower, are much more marginal in numbers and impact on rural energy provision.
How can we explain the success of pico-hydropower? First of all, the country is ideally suited for this type of technology. There are plenty of river and streams available to place the small turbines in. Moreover, the turbines are cheap and can be found in every provincial and district shop in the northern provinces of Laos, along with other hardware from China and Vietnam. Thirdly, there is a strong local knowledge base around the technology: people know how to install, maintain and carry out the necessary repairs. Undoubtedly, it has taken time for this knowledge and these networks of distribution and support systems to develop. In other words, a project, coming from outside, could never achieve this level of sustainability in the short time span of a project!
The example of pico-hydropower shows that rather than thinking in terms of projects using renewable energy, it is better to look at knowledge, distribution and support systems which are already there, and build upon those. In the case of pico-hydropower, the Lao Institute for Renewable Energy (LIRE), is currently doing this. This is undoubtedly more challenging than setting up demonstration sites and technology transfer projects, but perhaps more than just a ‘dream'.
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If you want to read more, please read the article by Mattijs Smits and Simon Bush ‘A light left in the dark: The practice and politics of pico-hydropower in the Lao PDR' at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.08.058
Lao PDR Takes Steps to Strengthen its Water Resource Management
by Dr. Alfred Birch, Team Leader, Nam Ngum River Basin Project
Lao PDR has a relatively large water resource, particularly when this is placed in the context of its limited arable land and low population. While the country forms about 25% of the area of the Mekong Basin, it contributes 35% of the river's average annual flow. Utilization of these water resources includes water supply and sanitation, hydropower, irrigation, tourism, fisheries, and manufacturing and processing industries. The country's relatively abundant water resources may have, in the past, given a false impression that water resource management and allocation was unimportant. Laos is now coming to recognize that water scarcity can occur in the dry season in upstream locations, in some river basins and small tributaries, and downstream from some major developments. Major water resource investment projects will likely require official, secure water rights. Water quality is also sensitive to major development activities and needs to be monitored and managed more effectively. Both hydropower and mining development could, for example, significantly degrade downstream water quality. Groundwater is another key part of the country's national water resources and the major source of rural domestic water supply.
Integrated Water Resource Management Capacity
So, where does the country stand in terms of building the capacity to address these and other important water resource issues? First, the Government has clearly indicated its support for a strong and coordinated approach to water resources and environmental management. The Water Resources and Environment Administration was formed in May 2007. Since that time the Administration has strengthened its internal organization, developed legal mandates, expanded the number of staff, created provincial and district offices and initiated its programs and activities. In March 2009 the Prime Minister issued a decree on the establishment and activities of the Lao National Mekong Committee. This Committee has been reorganized, with a Deputy Prime Minister as the Honorary Chairman and Leader. Its mandate has been expanded to cover not only international water management issues under the 1995 MRC agreement, but also national policy advice and inter-ministry coordination on water resources.
The new LNMC decree also gives a legal basis for the formation of river basin committees. This will be another important step in building up the national capacity for integrated planning and management of water resources in Lao PDR, including inter-provincial and inter-district involvement and coordination on water resources and water resource projects. It is expected that other river basin committees may be formed soon after. The role of river basin committees will focus on coordination between local governments, management of IWRM planning, advice to Government on policies and plans, and dispute resolution.
In addition to these institutional developments, a National Water Resources Policy and Strategy is being prepared to provide a sectoral and strategic basis for water sector activities. This Policy and Strategy will help to link national development plans and policies with concrete actions in the water sector, both under WREA and other line agencies and local governments. Laos also hopes to initiate very soon a review and updating of its national water resource legislation.
Integrated river basin planning is also being developed at various levels. The Mekong River Commission is leading the Basin Development Plan process for the overall Mekong Basin, as well as other related programs and initiatives which will help to address strategic, international issues. These include hydropower development on the mainstream of the Mekong and other issues which will significantly influence national development plans and projects.
At the major tributary level in Laos, a Nam Ngum River Basin IWRM plan has been drafted under the Nam Ngum River Basin Project and in coordination with a Cumulative Impact Assessment Study linked to the Nam Ngum 3 development. The NNRB Committee is expected to play an important role in overseeing the implementation of the plan.
At the sub-basin or watershed level, plans have been or will be developed in a number of locations. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has led this process with respect to watershed plans with a landscape and rural development orientation. WREA is now exploring a more water-oriented approach in or adjacent to the Nam Ngum basin and is continuing to discuss with MAF, the Land Management Authority and others regarding the best approach to coordination and division of responsibilities for this scale of planning.
Next Steps
Despite this wide range of IWRM capacity building steps, much more remains to be done. In many of the areas mentioned Laos is still at a very early stage. Its legal basis is still rather limited. Mandates have been developed but some areas need to be further clarified for better coordination and efficiency. The financial basis of IWRM and on-the-ground investments is also limited. Policies are needed on balancing national budget support, water user benefit sharing and international assistance.
The National Water Resource Policy and Strategy should help to set out a road map and priorities for the next 5 years. Laos is also developing, in cooperation with a number of international development partners, a National IWRM Support Program. In its current form this Support Program includes ten important components for capacity building, ranging from policy, strategy and legislation development, to river basin planning and institutional support, to technical areas such as data management, water quality and groundwater management. The Support Program will also include a broad training program as well as assistance for the National University to implement its plans for IWRM training.
(Originally prepared for an address given by H.E. Mme Khempheng Pholsena,
Minister responsible for the Water Resource and Environment Administration, Lao PDR, 5 May 2009)
How to Put the Last First in the Global Climate Policy? Towards New Robust Institutions for Global Burden Sharing
by Research Director, Dr. Jari Kaivo-oja, Finland Futures Research Centre
Understanding of the magnitude, causes, and implications of climate change continues to grow. Political concern about poorly understood but potentially catastrophic impacts of human-induced climate change drives us to identify, evaluate, and initiate concrete policy actions to address human activities such as the industrial and car emissions of greenhouse gases, land use changes, and forestry and agricultural practices, which all are believed to contribute to climate change.
In 2006, Friends of the Earth (FoE) England, Wales and Northern Ireland http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/Climate-CostsofInaction.pdf estimated that the costs of inaction would be really high. According to FoE, economic models have estimated damages as great as US$74 trillion if we do not take action, but even these big numbers fail to convey the multiple harms that lie in store for the world. We can conclude that there are serious economic and political reasons to implement climate policies which decrease the harmful impacts of global climate change.
One big global political question is how to share the burden of climate policy activities. The problem of international ‘burden sharing' or ‘effort sharing' is a complex policy problem. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, developed countries will need to collectively reduce global emissions 25% to 40% below 1990 levels by 2020. As the economies and emissions of developing countries grow in absolute and relative terms, they will, by 2020, account for more than 50% of global emissions. Therefore, dynamic developing countries like China, India and Brazil - in particular those which are major CO2 emitters, and those which have graduated or should graduate from developing to developed status - will also need to take action in the future.
Negotiations are currently underway to secure a new international agreement on climate change to take effect when the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012. Many science policy experts are now hopeful that a workable deal will be struck during 2010. A good scientific source to follow this burden sharing discussion is the new IPS report of the School of Government at the Victoria University of Wellington http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7584_0a035c1f432.pdf which was published in 2008. This IPS summary report tells us that the Kyoto Protocol provides just a stepping stone towards equitable and effective tackling of the climate change. The IPS report also tells us that developed countries will also need to strengthen their assistance to developing countries. The period up to 2020 should be regarded as a transition period for the developing countries. One future reality check will take place in 2020 when the developing countries should be more ready to face the burdens of climate change mitigation efforts.
There needs to be an international effort to boost investment in the research, development and deployment of low-emission processes and products. For example, the Mekong River projects of TSE Finland Futures Research Centre concretize this kind of global climate policy effort in the Mekong river countries. Step by step projects and efforts are now needed to boost low-carbon strategies and associated real activities in the Mekong River countries.
A great number of new innovative climate change activities are needed in the near future. A policy agenda for global climate change mitigation is full of problematic issues, which all require innovative solutions. Especially the future role and cost burden of developing countries is under heavy policy dialogue. Each country's effort to reduce emissions will need to be determined in respect of their circumstances.
On a theoretical level, equality, capability and historic responsibility consistently turn up in the literature as important factors in determining how much of the burden of mitigation particular countries should agree to take on. On the other hand, poverty is still a real and serious problem in the developing countries. We cannot send the full bill of global climate actions to the poorest of the poor. This would not be an ethical solution to the global climate change.
Since climate change is a collective action problem, the only effective way it can be addressed is through global cooperation, where developing countries are leading the efforts of mitigation. Although robust institutions for global burden sharing do not exist yet, it is in our interests to build them if we want to build up social sustainability in the global climate policy. In the long run, developed countries must give climate change mitigation responsibilities to developing countries, but only stage by stage, not by sudden ad hoc decisions.
New robust institutions for global burden sharing are needed in order to build up fair global solutions and systematic stage by stage processes. This is my personal wisdom. Otherwise, the reality check of 2020 will be a busy kick-off meeting for a crisis management project for the global community.
FINLAND FUTURES RESEARCH CENTRE